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RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTYt

T HE recent publication in two volumes of the Restatement
of the Law of Property as adopted by the American Law
Institute presents in final form the first two and one-half
divisions of the entire field of property. A substantial fragment, these portray a more definite picture of the form and
content of the final Restatement of the Law of Property as
a whole, than did the tentative drafts,1 published piecemeal
in the past. Although allowances are made for the speeding
up of the work by dividing it among separate groups, working
concurrently, the completion of restating the entire field of
property is still a thing of the future. These considerations
suggest that an estimate of what has been done is not out of
place, especially if one assumes that the partial facts disclosed by these two volumes can be used as a basis for predicting the probability of the ultimate success of the whole.
If that assumption is unfounded, and predictability is lacking, we can at least appraise the extent to which these volumes have accomplished the purposes of restatement within
the policies of the American Law Institute.
As originally planned, the Restatement was to be "a
summary of principles stated with such fullness as will afford an adequate presentation of the subject, somewhat after
the manner of Dicey's Conflict of Laws or Stephen's Digest

f-Volumes

I and II. St. Paul: American Law Institute, Publishers, 1936.
'The Tentative Drafts of the Restatement of the Law of Property were
published in the following order: No. 1-March 25, 1929; No. 2-March 31,
1930; No. 3-March 12, 1931; No. 4-March 6, 1933; No. 5-March 15, 1934;
No. 6-March 4, 1935; No. 7-March 16, 1937; No. 8-March 18, 1937.
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of the Law of Evidence ** *. Accompanying each Restatement there will be a treatise which is to consist of a complete
exposition of the present condition of the law and a full citation of authorities." 2 Furthermore, "The work should contain a complete citation of authorities, decisions, treatises
and articles. The legal profession will never have confidence
in the result unless those responsible for the work give this
tangible proof and set forth any differences between the law
expressed in statements of principles and that found in the
decisions of the courts in each state considered separately." 3
In the field of Property, the policy of the Institute provided
for "an orderly statement of the general common law of the
United States * * *; and also the law that has grown from
the application by the courts of statutes that have been generally enacted and have been in force for many years." " It
was not intended to restate all of the law comprehended by
the term Property, but only those parts which have an "underlying and widely pervasive importance" 5 or which are aspects of the subject in which the clarifying and simplifying
process of restatement is particularly needed. Nor is the
Restatement intended to be "a complete philosophical system
by which every possible case can be tested" 6 but the more
modest task of clarifying the law.
The arrangement is a scientific classification of rules
within the comfortably flexible outlines of a very broad field.
In reality, the criteria of inclusion and exclusion have been
to some extent fashioned by the Institute. Simplicity and
classification to the end that certainty might be achieved are
controlling desiderata. "It will be invested with unique authority, not to command, but to persuade ** *. Universities
and bench and bar will have had a part in its creation." 7
The work is being done by carefully selected lawyers for the
use of the profession. The accuracy of the statements of law
made, rests upon the authority of the Institute.
CARDOZO, GROWTH OF THE LAW

(1924)

7.

LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, pt. 1, 22.
' 1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936) pp. viii, ix.
'1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936) 1.
6 Scott, Restatement of the Law of Trusts (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 1266,
'AMERICAN

1269.

CARnOZO, GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924) 9.
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The foregoing are general statements concerning the
Restatement of law which can be applied to each one of the
various fields covered. The Restatements are the products
of belief and faith that the law can be restated as a logical
system abstracted from the cases according to the traditional
method of legal thought and action. But there are those who
have not conformed either in whole or in part. Critics have
not been wanting. 8 When one considers the number of distinguished leaders in American legal scholarship who have
contributed to these two volumes 9 and who have been work' Herewith is a list of reviews and articles evaluating from different viewpoints the output of the Institute: Corbin, The Restatement of the Law of
Contracts (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 602; Corbin, Some Problems in the Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 652; Goble, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1933) 21 CAL F. L. Rav. 421; Whitney, Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1934) 8 ST. JoHN's L. Rv. 440; Patterson, The
Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1933) 33 Cor- L. REv. 397; Clark, The
Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 643; Pollock,
Restatement of the Law of Contracts,Book Review (1933) 47 HARV. L. Rv.
363; Frey, Restating Law of Business Associations (1929) 15 A. B. A. J. 503;
Scott, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 496;
Arnold, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts (1931) 31 CoL. L. REv. 800;
O'Toole, Restatement of the Law of Trusts (1936) 10 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 386;
Seavey, Problems in Restatement of the Law of Agency (1930) 16 A. B. A. J.
117; Pollitt, Some Comments on the Restatement of Agency (1929) 17 Gao.
L. J. 177, 283, (1930) 18 Gao. L. J. 327; Farnum, Terminology and The American Law Institute (1933) 13 B. U. L. Rav. 203; Yntema, The American Law
Institute (1934) 12 CAN. B. Ray. 319; Franklin, The Historic Function of the
American Law Institute: Restatement as Transitionalto Codification (1934) 47
HARv. L. Ray. 1367; Corbin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the
American Law Institute (1929) 15 IowA L. Ra,. 19; Winfield, The Restatement
of the Law of Torts: Intentional Harms (1935) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. 557, 13 N.
Y. U. L. Q. 1; Goodhart, Restatement of the Law of Torts (1935) 83 U. oF
PA. L. Rav. 411, 968; Gifford, Restatemeist of the Law of Torts (1935) 9 ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 488; Stallybrass, Restatement of the Law of Torts, Book
Review (1935) 48 HARv. L. REv. 1444; Read, Restatement of the Law of
Conflict of Laws, Book Review (1935) 49 HARv. L. REv. 346; Harrow, Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws (1935) 9 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 485;
Evans, Restatenent of the Law of'Conflict of Laws, Book Review (1935)
24 Ky. L. J. 103; Bennett, Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, Book
Review (1935) 10 TuLANE L. Rav. 159; Rebmann, Restatement of the Law
of Agency, Book Review (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 672.
'A partial list is as follows: Dean Harry A. Bigelow of the Law School
of the University of Chicago; Professor Robert R. Powell of the Law School

of Columbia University; Professor W. Barton Leach of the Law School of Harvard University; Dean Charles E. Clark of the Law School of Yale University;
Dean Everett Fraser of the Law School of the University of Minnesota; Professor Oliver S. Rundell of the Law School of the University of Wisconsin; Henry
Upson Sims, Esq., of Birmingham. Ala.; Professor Ralph W. Aigler of the Law
School of the University of Michigan; Professor George G. Bogert of the
Law School of the University of Chicago; Professor A. James Casner of the
Law School of the University of Illinois; Professor Albert C. Jacobs of the
Law School of Columbia University; Professor J. Warren Madden of the
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ing for nearly a decade in their production, without sparing
time or effort, one can realize what a formidable task a complete evaluation presents. Fully performed, it might require
a restudy of the thousands of cases examined by the Reporter;
--which approaches impossibility and even raises an unpleasant presumption. For surely, the promulgation by the American Law Institute creates a presumption of validity for conclusions derived from the data used, but not necessarily a
guarantee or assurance as to utility to the profession. How
far has the work in the two volumes complied with the original plans and purposes, and if there have been departures
or shortcomings, what is their effect, if any, on its ultimate
success? This inquiry may be the basis of a fair criticisma partial evaluation based on these two volumes.
What law shall be restated, and in what way? The problems of scope and of language demand a plan. This is
stated in a scope note as follows: "Volumes I and II, herewith published, embrace general matters of terminology
(Chapter I) ; the creation and general characteristics of freehold estates (Chapters 2-6) ; and the large body of material
stating the characteristics of future interests (Chapters 717). Volume III is designed to complete future interests
and to include not only the construction of limitations but
also the law applicable to powers of appointments and expectancies. Volume IV will treat generally the social restrictions imposed upon the creation of property interests,
including the restrictions upon the purposes for which trusts
can be created, the rule against perpetuities and the rules
against accumulation. Volume V is to restate the law of
easements and profits together with other aspects of the rights
and privileges of the owner of land as to physical use. Two
large aspects of the law of Property have been separately restated as the law of Trusts and the law of the Sales of
Land." 10
Law School of the University of Pittsburgh; Professor Lewis M. Simes of
the Law School of the University of Michigan; Professor Joseph Warren of
the Law School of Harvard University; and Charles C. White, Esq., of Cleveland, Ohio.
10

1

RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY

(1937)

1, 2.
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Landlord and Tenant, Vendor and Purchaser, are to
come; Trusts are treated separately; and Trespass to Land
is found in the Torts Restatement. Evidently the material
is to be arranged to follow classifications familiar to lawyers.
One critic, in discussing the difference between conventional
and functional classification, maintains that much of the material put in the Restatement of Trusts could profitably be
placed in the Lalw of Future Interests in Property,but that
to depart from the conventional would work against the usefulness of the Restatement to court room lawyers. The treatment of each type of estate by itself, rather than treating all
of the estates through a common characteristic, is a logical
development. The law of real property is based upon the
theory of estates. Due to the development of land ownership
under the Feudal System, historically, the development of
estates in land under what is known as the formulary theory,
necessarily produced what has been called the doctrine of
fixed types. Men do not create rights in land by means of
an individual expression as in a contract, but rather by the
use of one of these fixed types or models. The grantor uses
a certain form of deed and on the transfer of the same, the
law attaches many legal consequences not written down in
the instrument. The personal desires as to alienation, inheritance, use and enjoyment are affixed to the transaction
by law; and as they are not set down in express terms according to the individual wish of the creator, he is compelled
to use a particular estate as it has developed under the law
to suit his particular purpose. The Restatement treatment
is historical in that it treats separately each one of the types
as to creation, transfer, and legal consequences.
An examination of the table of contents is illuminating.
It discloses even to the unpracticed that the Reporter has proceeded according to a plan which in its main outline is conventional, but in detail has distinctive features. One of these
is the importance and significance given to terminology.
Going from the table of contents to the book itself, one can
perceive the awareness of the paramount importance of terminology and language. Not only are the first two chapters
devoted to definitions of terms, but the language used
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throughout and the many notes 11 which point out the elimination of old terms and their replacement 12 by new, are instinct with the struggle for clarity and simplicity of expression. This desire is well expressed by the present Reporter,
Professor Powell:
"The Reporter and this group decided that the most
important first step in any work in the field of property would be the attainment of a common parlance
of precision with which the ideas found in the American Law of property could be expressed with definiteness and accuracy and in a fashion certain to be understood by the profession with the same connotations as
the language bore to those who wrote it for the Institute. Persons familiar only with the ordinary exchanges of ideas between intelligent people, have little
realization of the extreme difficulty of so framing a
sentence that it expresses exactly what is in the thinker's mind, and the equal difficulty of being sure that
the language used will have the same meaning and
connotations to his reader as it had to the thinker. It
was felt that the terminology of 'right, power, privilege and immunity' would be one useful tool in the
attainment of the desired precision. Other terms used
with frequency in the law of property have been defined tentatively." 18
Legal terminology has been the topic of much writing
and discussion, particularly among those persons who are
1 1 RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY (1937) Div. 3, pt. 1, also c. 7, Introductory
Note.
' For example: one hoary term is scrapped in § 24 where we find a new
coinage in "power of termination" instead of "right of re-entry" arising on a
breach of condition in an estate on condition subsequent. This is a logical
requirement of the Hohfeld system of terminology which has been adopted,
and is referred to later.
§44, p. 120, Special Note. The terms "base fee", "conditional fee",
"qualified fee", "conditional limitation" are not used in the Restatement.
§ 157, p. 542, Note on Terminology. "Contingent remainder" is not used
in the Restatement because the term has been used too frequently in a loose
manner to designate any remainder involving uncertainty.
§ 157, p. 552, Special Note. Here the Reporter Voints out particular
instances that make the use of the term "contingent remainder" undesirable.
'Powell, A Restatement of the Law of Property (1930) 16 A. B. A. J.
197.
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grouped under the name of realists. Discussions, frequently
vehement, as to the nature of law, its concepts and language,
have often concerned themselves with an attack upon terminology. 14 Such words as property, property rights, possession, title are said to be "magic solving words of traditional
jurisprudence, sounds for concepts which have no verifiable
existence"! 15 In general, the content of the Property Restatement will furnish little comfort to the modern sociological jurisprudes. For example, one well-known writer
speaks of property as a function of inequality. This, of
course, is not a definition, but a mere line taken from the text
which argues for description rather than definition. The Restatement uses the word "property" to denote legal relations
between persons with respect to a thing.1 6
The language used in the Restatement and the formation
of the rules themselves in the definitions may be said to be
molded in the traditional school, but modified to the needs of
clarity and precision as interpreted by the Institute. To this
end the Hohfeld system of terminology has been adopted
almost in toto.
The first volume contains two divisions. Division one
comprises an introductory scope note and Chapter I, definitions of certain general terms. The terminology of Holifeld
is introduced here in the definitions of right, privilege, power,
and immunity; throughout the two volumes the Hohfeldian
system is strictly adhered to. On the other hand, the word
"title" is defined in the second note under Section 10, "owner"
as a term having a dual signification; (1) ownership or claim
of ownership, and (2) the operative facts (note Hohfeldian
influence) which result in such ownership. As to (1) ownership is substituted, and as to (2) the explanation is made that
it has not been found necessary to use the term as denoting
the operative facts which result in the existence of an interest rather than the interest itself. This division is analytically sound. The same can be said of the general terms defined and analyzed in this chapter, to wit: interest, legal and
" Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the Functional Approach (1935)
COL. L. REv. 809, 820.
2

Id. Aft 820.

111

RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY

(1937) 3.
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equitable interests in land, possessory interests in land, real
property, estate, conveyance, devise and transfer.
These definitions of general terms disclose exact thinking and superb use of language to obtain definite and certain
expression, and this comment is applicable throughout the
book. But will rejection of the word "title" and if you please,
the "title concept", make the books more "useful" to the
lawyers? Bearing in mind what the "realists" have tried to
do to the "title concept" 17 and the word "title", it nevertheless looms large in the terminology of the practicing lawyer.
"Transfer" (Section 13) is defined in a way that makes for
clarity: the idea embodied in the words "extinguishment of
such interests existing in one person and the creation of such
interests in another person" is one that can be grasped.
Treatises and other writings, especially the cases themselves, contain many statements of rules so general that applications to particular fact situations often are not only difficult, but also produce diverse results. The Restatement of
the Law of freehold estates (Division II) portrays a conscious effort to particularize within the field of freehold estates by first defining and then stating the rules of creation
of transfer and characteristics.
The method employed is the usual triple division, i.e.,
the black letter definition or statement, and comments, usually, but not always, followed by illustrations. The definitions in Chapter 2 include not only those of estates in fee
simple and for life, but the lesser known, such as fee simple
conditional and fee tail. The inclusion in "freehold estates"
of definitions of estates for years and other (usually) nonfreehold estates is somewhat confusing. The explanation is
the desire for uniform terminology and as an aid "to the
understanding of the freehold estates." 18
Departing for a moment from questions of terminology
to consider the form or arrangement, one notes that the common law rule is usually stated in black letter type even
though that rule may be one that is socially undesirable, and
may not represent the law in many jurisdictions.
7

In Sec-

' VIDE, LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES

1 RESTATEMENT,

PROPERTY

(1937) Introductory Note, p. 37.

(1930).
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tion 27, the rule is stated that in a conveyance of land an
estate in fee simple absolute can be transferred only if the
conveyance contains words of general inheritance with respect to the conveyee. This is undoubtedly a correct statement of the early common law rule. The special note following the black letter further states that this rule has been
supplanted as to deeds in all jurisdictions except Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and
Vermont; that as to New Hampshire, the rule has probably
been abrogated by judicial decision and there is doubt as to
whether it exists in Vermont. It is submitted that if deeds
do not require words of inheritance in nearly all of the jurisdictions, excepting those mentioned above, we have here a
statement of the rule in inverse order. In other words, a
lawyer might ask, why state a rule of the early common law
when it has ceased to be law in so many jurisdictions? Should
the rule be stated otherwise and the common law exceptions
then noted? This is a question of form that may well be
raised by a lawyer. The reason for stating the common law
rule even though it may not be the rule in most jurisdictions
is explained by the Reporter as a desire for consistency of
treatment, and further, that the approach of the Restatement, according to the Reporter, should state what the decision would be today in such cases in jurisdictions following
the common law.' 9 However, the lawyer, searching for the
law, must understand this technique, namely, restating in
black letter type the common law rule, and proceed according
to the notes and comments. Of course, such treatment makes
for uniformity and is in accordance with the usual plan of
the Restatement. 20 As to the difficulties involved in studying
the Restatement, we agree with the Reporter "that the Restatement is not designed for casual reading and no one who
reads it with even a fair degree of attention can be misled
as to the relation between the parts in question." 21 Section
"RESTATEMENT,

PROPERTY

(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1929) Explanatory Note,

p. 17.

A word of commendation should be given for the excellent format of the
two volumes; also for the index, pp. 1035, 1179.
21 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1929) 5, 15. If the reader
had the explanatory notes of the tentative drafts before him, difficulties of this
sort would be readily eliminated.
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31 states the rule in Shelley's Case as a rule of the general
common law. Rationalization shows that this rule should
not be applied to our social institutions. Its statement as
law by the Institute shows the inherent difficulties of their
task. Twenty-seven states by statute have abolished its application to wills and deeds; five have abolished its operation
as to wills; and three others have statutes aimed at the rule.
In these states, no judicial declarations or statutes exist,
whereas eleven states retain the rule as part of the common
law of those jurisdictions, and even in some of these the rule
is affected indirectly by statutes abolishing estates in fee tail.
Again the need of annotation for the Restatement is evident.
The same conscientious effort for accuracy and particularization is reflected in the statements of rules. Here one
can find very little to criticize. Where there have been statutory changes, they are carefully noted, as for example, the
requirement of such words as "and his heirs" as words of
general inheritance.2 2 These special notes occur frequently 28
to explain a departure from the usual terminology, and, also
to indicate absence of judicial authority, often in the form
of a caveat.
The use of caveats to indicate gaps in the law, or as absence of authoritative data, is commendable and in accordance
with the original purposes and plans for restatement. On
the other hand, the Institute has, at times, stated rules to be
law that seem contra to judicial authority. Thus in Section
54, the rule as stated provides that if the husband or wife
had a fee simple defeasible, the interest (dower or curtesy)
of the surviving spouse is subject to the defeasibility which
existed as to the estate of the deceased spouse. Section 54,
as thus stated, applies to estates in fee simple determinable,
to estates in fee simple, subject to a condition subsequent,
and also to estates in fee simple, subject to an executory limitation. In the last named type, the weight of authority holds
I RESTATEMENT,
are examples.

PROPERTY (1937)

§ 27, comment a and § 39, Special Notes

'RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY (1937) c. 4, Introductory Note, p. 120. That
the terms "base fee", "conditional fee", "qualified fee" or "conditional limitation" and their historical application and divergent meanings tend to confusion,
all, especially students, will agree; and that there is a danger of anachronistic
expression is also true.
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that the surviving spouse would retain dower or curtesy even
though the estate of the sooner dying spouse has been extinguished. The majority of states have followed Lord Mansfield's decision in Buckworth v. Thirkell 24 on this point:
"In the United States, eleven states have followed the
lead of Buckworth v. Thirkell, three states have refused to follow this lead, and thirty-four states exist
in which guidance afforded by the Institute may be
sufficient to turn the scales when the question is raised
for discussion." 25
Even though the able monograph of the Reporter, just
referred to, does expose the unsoundness of the rule, the fact
remains that the Institute is not restating the law but rather
telling us what it ought to be. If Section 54 serves to guide
the courts of thirty-four states so much is gained, but since
it is "contrary to the general impression prevalent in the
legal profession," 26 the lawyers may develop suspicion that
in other places the Institute is more concerned with stating
what the law ought to be rather than with the Restatement.
Section 54 could have been stated with an exception to cover
the executory limitation type with a properly drawn caveat
to cover this. That would not be out of harmony with Sections 75, 84 and 93.
Section 115 allowing implications of cross remainders in
estates for life held as tenants in common, in deeds as well
as wills, involves the troublesome question of lack of authority. The rule is undoubtedly sound and its adoption by the
Institute may have guided the New York Legislature which
27
recently adopted a statute to that effect.
The rights, powers, privileges, and immunities of ownership in law and equity, making up the sum total of the relationships involved, are arranged under the caption of "characteristics". This organization of material in adherence to
±3

Bos. and P. 652 (C. P. 1804).
PROPERTY (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1930) Explanatory Note,

'RESTATEMENT,

p. 14.

1

RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY

R. P. L. § 66-a, c. 48,

(1937) app. 11.

in effect March 12, 1937.
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a plan makes the work more usable. Characteristics of estates are arranged as Topic 2, following the material involved
in Creation, Topic 1, except the estate of the fee simple absolute. This material covering the curtailments of rights,
powers, privileges, and immunities by easements, profits,
covenants, etc., is left for Division V. It is doubtful whether
this omission or postponement will make the book more effective for a lawyer. Certainly, here, rigid adherence to a
plan which will necessitate a search for the rules of partition
through five volumes (when completed) is not the most convenient arrangement. The characteristics of the life estate,
on the other hand, is a scientifically organized body of material where one can locate a rule and find it in its proper
setting.
In Section 118, it is provided that a life tenant in possession can recover from a tort feasor only the damages done
to his life estate. The authorities in the majority of jurisdictions under the common law do not so hold. The fundamental law of possession makes the one in possession owner
against third parties; he has nearly all of the rights, powers,
privileges and immunities. Certainly Section 118 does not
state the common law of New York as applied in Rogers v.
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co.28 The rule is now regulated by
statute in New York 2 9 The rule applied in the Rogers case 0
is not inconsistent with the rule in Section 146 that the life
tenant is not liable for damage caused by a stranger. That
there is a division of authority is well known. The Institute
should at least make this clear. Again we see the need for
annotation, not only annotations from the law of any particular jurisdiction, but excerpts, if not all of the material,
used in the discussions of this rule by the Institute.
The careful analysis and arrangement of material found
in Volume I appears in Volume I1, dealing with future interests. The arrangement is somewhat different from that of
possessory estates. In Part I, the five types of future interests are differentiated, namely, reversions, possibilities of
- 213 N. Y. 246, 107 N. E. 661 (1915).
R. P. L. §538.
'WALSM,

LAW OF PROPERTY (2d ed. 1927) 104.
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reverters, powers of termination, remainders, executory interests, and Part II treats them as to characteristics, transferability, succession, subjection to claim of creditors, and partition. Here the arrangement is less historical and more in
accordance with the modern trend to consider under one topic
aspects of all future interests. The same adherence to Hohfeldian terminology is also maintained throughout the material on future interests. The term "contingent remainder"
is not used in the Restatement, as explained in Section 157,
"Note on Terminology." Its loss will not be mourned, when
lawyers learn how to speak and think in accordance with the
new terms. On the other hand, this new terminology (not
necessarily Hohfeldian) is likely to cause confusion for the
New York lawyer and the profession generally. Section 159
states that a reversionary interest may be transferred inter
vivos, and Section 159, comment, states that a reversionary
interest includes a possibility of reverter. A New York lawyer might question the ability to transfer .a possibility of
reverter in that state. That it may be released in New York
has recently been established,3 1 but the profession generally
has been taught that it cannot be transferred any more than
can a right of entry for breach of condition (power of termination). If the Restatement, in Section 159, states the
common law of New York, then the profession ought to have
an explanation of the position of the Institute. This could
be accomplished through a monograph similar to that of the
Reporter dealing with the severability of the power of termination, as found in the appendix at page 3.
In Section 154, comment b, it is not clear what happens
when there is an interest "left in the transferor" who dies
leaving a will which does not 6therwise dispose of such interests, but which contains a residuary clause. Does such
interest pass as a reversion or as a remainder? Section 160
states the common law rule that powers of termination are
not transferable. The various channels of development mentioned in Section 162 that have evolved a change in the rule
making remainders and executory interests transferable at
'Trustees
(1928).

of Calvary Church v. Putnam, 249 N. Y. 111, 162 N. E. 601
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common law have not affected this tough old rule which the
Reporter in tentative draft number 4, page 114, admits is an
anachronism. But is it necessary to retain that relic of antiquity found in Section 160, comment c, that a power of termination is destroyed by an attempt to make such a transfer?
The rule as stated has been found in decisions in five states,
but these are of doubtful validity. Surely the trend is the
other way. However, the position of the Institute may lead
to desirable legislation. Here again annotation and citation
of cases would make for clarity and usefulness, especially
since the opposite rule is stated in the tentative draft number 4, Section 201, comment c.
It is evident that the Restatement is something more
than a mere rewriting. It discloses that the Institute has
not only re-examined the authorities closely and critically in
order to find the law, but that logical analysis has produced
reclassification. The treatment of a possibility of reverter
and the right of re-entry, already discussed, is in point. An
examination of the text writers shows that these two interests were generally regarded as not alienable, descendable,
or devisable at the common law, and that the two were often
treated as legal Siamese twins. In the Restatement they are
now separated and re-classified. The right of re-entry as
stated before, is now described in the Restatement as power
of termination in Section 24. The distinction between "reversion" and "possibility of reverter" is historical. The possibility of reverter and a reversion are both reversionary interests, the distinction being that one is subject to a condition
precedent and the other is not. This new treatment gives to
the Restatement the aspect, at times, of a code. Such innovations as above mentioned may well create a doubt as to
whether or not American lawyers, trained in the traditional
methods of the common law, will be willing, at first, to accept the almost dogmatic statements to be found here and
there in the Restatement of the Law of Property. Here again
we see the need of clarifying notes and annotations.
Section 162 states that the owner of any remainder or
executory interest in land has the power to transfer his interest. The historical comment containing statutes of vari-
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ous states shows very clearly the logical method of analysis
used for this statement. Comment e, however, points out a
large field in which such interests are not transferable, such
as spendthrift trusts. The cross reference to the law of trusts
could be profitably supplemented by annotations. A New
York lawyer would need more than either Restatement
(Property or Trusts) to solve a problem involving suspension of alienation.
Section 164, comment c, rules that possibilities of reverter and powers of termination are governed by exactly the
same rules of descent as remainders, reversions, and executory interests. This is another case of conflicting common
law rules. Lawyers in four states, including New York,
should be given the reasons for this position, which is contra
32
to Upington v. Corrigan.
Section 165, comment a, rules that possibilities of reverter and powers of termination are devisable. What has
been said above applies here to the extent that the Institute
has rejected the rule in Michigan and New York.
The material on Estates for Life, Sections 10T to 152
inclusive, is remarkable for its clarity and brevity. The
rules as to creation and characteristics of that interest are
set forth in clear, simple fashion, except that Section 140,
Duty of the Life Tenant Not to Make Changes in the Premises, perhaps states the rule too broadly. The rule as stated
is that life tenants shall make no changes to which the owners of the interest, limited after the estate for life, have a
reasonable ground for objection. There are many cases prohibiting changes to which owners of the interest, limited
after the estate, did not have a ground for objection. The
law here seems to be shifting under one's feet and, as stated,
the rule is not a safe guide for a lawyer.
The protection afforded by the law to the owner of future
interests against the acts and omissions of the owner of the
present interest are found in Sections 187 to 210. Although
objection may be raised to the treating of waste in various
parts of the two volumes, it was probably placed here to
maintain uniformity in the plan. Sections 193 and 194 con= 151 N. Y. 143, 45 N. E. 359 (1896).
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tain a succinct and very clear statement of the rights and
liabilities in equity and law of the owner of a future interest
in fee simple, following a simple estate in fee simple defeasible, as far as it is possible to restate such rules.
Section 240 provides against the destructibility of remainders subject to a condition precedent in the case where
all prior interests are terminated before the condition precedent is fulfilled. That the English rule of the destructibility
of contingent remainders never became part of the common
law of any one of the United States is very clearly pointed
out in the notes in comments a, b, c and d of Section 240.
We would prefer to have had made more clear the extent
to which the various states have by statute adopted such
rules.
Whether the Restatement will be useful depends on
whether it will be used. As it stands now it is safe to say
that lawyers will buy it and leave it on library shelves. It
must be annotated. It is clear that the Institute in many
cases has stated as common law many rules that are anachronistic, oftentimes supported by little or no authority. This
it has been compelled to do from the very nature of the thing.
Again it has been forced to take a position where authorities
in different jurisdictions were evenly divided and sometimes
have stated rules contra to the weight of authority. The
American lawyer trained in the common law tradition will
want cases. This was one of the assurances of one of the
founders of the Institute, namely, that accompanying each
Restatement would be a treatise consisting of "a complete
exposition of the law and a full citation of authorities." 13
The desire for a case in point may be so controlling as
to prevent the use of the Restatement, not only by lawyers,
but by judges. A significant warning from high authority
was pointed directly to this requirement by Chief Judge
Pound of the New York Court of Appeals:
"Although we are not so closely tied to precedent today as formerly, I venture to say that one well considered decision in point made by a respected court when
CARozo,

GROWTH OF THE LAW

(1924) 7.
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cited on a brief will count for more in winning a de-

cision than all the students' notes and scholars' restatements of the law." 34
Assume that a lawyer brought a case of first impression,
or one in which the authorities were divided, and that he
cited a relevant section of the Restatement, to be sure, not as
authority, but for its persuasive force and as a guide to the

court. In such a situation, would not his position be stronger
if he could state the reasons that led to the adoption of the
rule in the Restatement and the supporting authorities? I
do not intend to infer that the courts will refrain from using
the Restatement, for such is not true. Even the tentative
drafts of property have found their way into the reports.3 5
Of course, the Institute is aware of the need of state
annotations, but to render the work usable, the annotations
3
should contain more than cases "accord" and "contra".6
There should be more material explaining why the rule was
stated in such section where there was doubt or dispute
among the advisers. Annotations should include all or relevant excerpts from the monographs of the Reporter, to the
end that we have a "complete exposition". The papers and
monographs (some in these two volumes, to be sure) of the
Reporters and advisers are splendid examples. These might
"Pound, Jurisprudence: Science or Superstition (1932) 18 A. B. A. J.
312, 313.
'THE RESTATEMENT IN THE COURTS, published by the Institute in February, 1935, showed that up to that time the tentative drafts had been used in the
following cases: Skelly Oil Co. v. Kelly, 134 Kan. 176, 179, 5 P. (2d) 823, 824
(1931) ; Bates v. Savings Bank, 135 Kan. 767, 773, 18 P. (2d) 143, 146 (1933) ;
Gunnison v. Evans, 136 Kan. 791, 794, 18 P. (2d) 191, 193 (1933) ; Waggoner
Estate v. Siegler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 519, 19 S. W. (2d) 27, 29 (1929) ;
Allen v. Trustees of Great Neck Free Church, 240 App. Div. 206, 269 N. Y.
Supp. 341, 350 (2d Dept. 1934) ; RESTATEMENT IN THE COURTS (1935) 222.
Nothing written herein should be taken as criticism of the excellent work
done by Professor Whiteside and his associates in annotating the Restatement
of the Law of Contracts. Indeed, the librarians at this school report that there
was an immediate and greatly increased demand for the annotated Contracts
Restatement as soon as it came out. Also that the work of David S. Edgar,
Jr., of this law school faculty, in annotating the Restatement of Torts, is being
awaited with eager anticipation. The results of present annotations argue
a fortiori for the larger demand mentioned herein. Assume that present
Restatements are annotated in fifty-nine jurisdictions. A fully equipped law
library would require sixty different volumes. Would it not be better to have
annotations, cases, and notes all in one volume, even though it would enlarge
the book?
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be put in a separate volume. The use of the tentative drafts
would hardly be sufficient. If time, energy, and money are
available, this should be done, if for no other purpose than
to insure the most complete success for work so well done to
date.
As stated before, there are those who do not believe that
the common law can be restated, earnest and sincere in the
conviction that the law is evolving so fast that by the time
the Restatement is done it will be necessary to restate the
Restatement. There is, of course, some validity in the objection but it does not apply to the law of land. The desire
for certainty and stability have always retarded rapid change
through either judicial decision or legislation. On the other
hand, it has already been pointed out how much of the law
of property is anachronistic and hoary with age. Perhaps
the Restatement, by disclosing such defects, may be used as
a help to eradicate them.
It has been demonstrated that the original plans have
not been followed in exact detail, but the original purposes
have been, and may be further enlarged upon. One of these
is clarification not only for individual use but for law reform.
Just recently the Institute has published a revision of Proposed Tentative Draft No. 1 of a Uniform Property Act.
While studying the Restatement, the reviewer asked himself
if it might not thus be used and this pamphlet is the answer.
For here are a few suggestions (taken at random) in the proposed Uniform Property Act: a statute, Section 8, which
makes effective, in an otherwise effective conveyance, transfer by one out of possession of land held adversely; Section
9, abolishing estates in fee tail and fee simple conditional;
Section 11, a statute abolishing the Rule in Shelley's Case;
Section 13, a statute abolishing the doctrine of Worthier
Title; Section 15, a statute providing that the termination
of precedent estates, before the happening of the contingency,
does not destroy the remainder contingent on such an event;
Section 23, a reasonable statute permitting ameliorative
waste, and many more. It also shows that the Institute probably through its work on the Restatement is not only fully
aware of the need of such changes, but has amassed the ma-

1937 ]

RESTATEMENT OF LAW OF PROPERTY

19

terial to indicate such a need. Is it not possible that the
Institute can and will go farther along this path?
The state of the law as to future interests in New York
is well known. Efforts made to correct the iniquities of
"the two life rule" and others contained in the revised statutes have been unavailing. The story of the struggle is found
in the combined report of the Decedent Estate Commission
of the State of New York.3 7 Here is a case of professorial
frustration worth studying. Here also is a field of endeavor
for the Institute and the Restatement. Experience with the
law of conveyances in New Jersey has shown the need of
change that should be welcomed in that state.
The query, whether or not the Restatements will be used
generally as teaching tools, has received varying answers.
One dissident has condemned the Restatements in withering
terms. 3 8 The position taken here cannot be said to represent
that of the majority of the teaching profession. It is, however, symptomatic of an ideology that predicts and desires
changes. The article from which it is taken challenges much
of the present order and raises issues far beyond the purview
of this article. The usefulness of the Restatement to teachers is more truly indicated in the following: "With the completion of the present Restatement project, the principal
tasks of doctrinal writing in the major fields of the law will
have been performed at least sufficiently for this generation." 39 This quotation is a line taken from context not in
'Combined Reports of the Decedent Estate Commission for the years
1928, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932, and 1933.
"The age of the classical jurists is over, I think. The 'Restatement of
the Law' by the American Law Institute is the last long-drawn-out gasp of a
dying tradition.

The more intelligent of our younger law teachers and students

are not interested in 'restating' the dogmas of legal theology.

There will, of

course, be imitators and followers of the classical jurists, in the years ahead.

But I think that the really creative legal thinkers of the future will not devote
themselves, in the manner of Williston, Wigriore, and their fellow masters, to
the taxonomy of legal concepts and to the systematic explication of principles

of 'justice' and 'reason', buttressed by 'correct' cases."

Cohen, Transcendental

Nonsense and the Functional Approach (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 833.
See also, M. Franklin, The Historic Function of the American Law Institute: Restatement as Transitional to Codification (1934) 47 HARV. L. REV.
1367; and cf. Patterson, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1933) 33
COL. L. REv. 397; E. S. Robinson, Law-An Unscientific Science (1935) 44
YALE L. J. 235, 261, id. p. 833, n.69.
' Sidney Post Simpson, The Function of the University Law School (1936)
49 HARV. L. lEv. 1076.
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any way criticizing the Restatement but delineating the pres-

ent and future tasks of teachers. Impliedly, the Restatement
is usable by teachers. It is submitted that even though "the
principal tasks of doctrinal writing * * * will have -been
performed" by the Restatement, the teachers will desire annotations. Another writer criticizes the Restatement of the

Law of Contracts on the ground that the citations of authorities are not given. But this criticism is based on another ground. This writer claims that the Restatement which

claims to be a scientific project is not scientifically done:
"But what would one think of a scientist who would publish
his conclusions to his fellow-experts without the data on

which they were based ?"

40

Although we are not entirely in

accord with this view the fact still remains that teachers,

for one reason or another, will require annotations.
That the professors of law have made generous use of

the various Restatements is shown by many of the later published case and material books. In his Cases and Readings
on Property, Professor Fraser has inserted the first chapter
of the Restatement as a basis for a preliminary discussion
of terms. 41 Professors Chafee and Simpson in their recent
outstanding work on Equity inserted sections and comments
(44 in all) from the Restatement of Conflict of Laws and the
Restatement of Contracts. Among the recent notable texts,
Simes, in his work on Future Interests, acknowledges his

obligation of the Institute for material furnished him by the
42
Institute.
oPatterson, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts (1933) 33 COL. L.
REv. 402.

" FRASER,

CASES

AND

READINGS

ON

PROPERTY

(1932) p. v. "The first

chapter of the American Law Institute's restatement of the law of property is
inserted, with grateful acknowledgment, as a basis for a preliminary discussion
of terms, and for convenient reference."
".SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS

(1936) p. iv.

"The greatest obliga-

tion is that to Professor Richard R. Powell, of the Columbia Law School,
Reporter of the American Law Institute for the-Restatement of Property, and
to the American Law Institute * * *. As an adiiser of the American Law
Institute for the Restatement of Property, the writer has also been furnished
with all the materials, both published and unpublished, which have been prepared by the Reporter. It has been his privilege for the last three years to be
present at the meetings of the Property Group of the American Law Institute
at which the Restatement of the law of Future Interests was under discussion.
That the materials of the Institute and the discussions of its Property Restatement Group were of great assistance in the preparation of this book goes
without saying."
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Occasionally one hears an expression of desire for a
code in this country. It has even been suggested that the
Restatement might be used as a basis for a code in the future.
Code adoption is highly problematical and among the problems preliminary to the adoption is the one of preparation.
The preparation of a code, if adopted through the efforts of
legal scholars or statesmen, would be done only after serious
study and research. For such purpose, the Restatement of
Property together with the material and experience of the
Institute would be invaluable. Already, the convenient arrangement of the Restatement has shown its utility in the
study of comparative law. A casual study of the proposed
code of property in Germany portrays the extent to which a
property code of law of any country reflects prevailing political philosophy. One writer describes the code as merely
serving an historic purpose and as one of the steps to be
taken in transition to codification. 4 3 Does codification in the
sense there used and predicted mean the abandonment of the
property concept? If it does, we believe that it is a long
way off. The Restatement of the Law of Property contains
nothing about a rational basis for property, but it does outline the history and shows how the rules developed as a part
of the common law. There are those of us who think the
common law will be with us for a long while yet. It has been
an aid in preserving and perpetuating democracy.
The Restatement of Property is the most scientific system, from the standpoint of arrangement and classification
of the common law of property, that we know of. It is the
result of prodigious effort and sustained hard work. Emerson said that a man is as lazy as he dares to be. The Reporters have not dared to be lazy in the face of an insistent
demand, the accomplishment of which was considered by
some to be an impossible task. From this partial evaluation, it is apparent that a real contribution to the science of
law will have been made when the entire field will have been
covered.
JOHN P. MALONEY.

St. John's University School of Law.
"Franklin, Historic Function of the American Law Institute: Restatement

as Transitional to Codification (1934) 47 HARV. L. REv. 1367.

